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Abstract 
The use of environmental taxes for pollution problems without spillovers is 
studied in a multi-jurisdictional setting. The problem is studied using the 
standard Mintz & Tulkens (1986) model for interjurisdictional tax competition. 
This is a model with 2 regions, two tradeable private goods: labour and a 
private consumption good which can be taxed at the production level and one 
non tradeable local public good. 
It is demonstrated that the tax competition literature results can not be 
translated to the environmental tax competition problem for externalities 
linked to production. 
Leiden, december 1992 
1 Rijksuniversiteit Leiden, Afdeling Openbare Financi~n. This article is 
an adapted version of a presentation from the author and S. Proost at 
the EAERE conference in Cracow, june 1992. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
There is an increased interest in the use of tax instruments in environmental 
policy in the European Community. One of the important questions is to what 
extent this policy instrument can be decentralized to the level of the member 
countries. For a closed economy and in the absence of environmental spillovers 
a Pigouvian tax is efficient if all sources are equally productive in 
generating the pollution and if the externality itself or a strictly 
complementary input or output can be monitored and taxed. Each country can set 
the tax at the level of the marginal damages. 
When environmental spillovers are introduced each country tends to neglect the 
damages in the other countries and a tax policy, like every decentralised 
environmental policy, is likely to be inefficient. 
In this paper we stick to the ideal case without spillovers and examine the 
possibilities of decentralisation of environmental taxes in an open economy 
where no import taxes or export taxes can be used. This will be the case in 
the EC when all border controls have been removed and where only origin based 
taxes can be used and no longer destination taxes (FOLMER & HOWE,1991, 
MOHR,l990, KEEN,l991). 
The dominant prescription as regards environmental taxes in a non-spillover 
case is to leave the use of environmental taxes to the jurisdictions 
(SIEBERT,l99l,MOHR,l990). 
The logic being that each jurisdiction can determine its own environmental 
quality. In the same strand OATES & SCHWAB (1988) demonstrate that 
jurisdictions competing for mobile capital and offering a combination of 
capital taxes and environmental stringency will not end up with a suboptimal 
environmental quality. 
The opponents of this decentralisation point to the dangers of a vicious 
circle of downward tax competition in a federation. The fear for this type of 
phenomenon has recently lead the EC commission to impose minimum tax rates for 
certain goods. 
In this paper we study the use of environmental taxes for pollution problems 
without spillovers in a multi- jurisdictional setting. The objective is to know 
the properties of this tax competition process and to appreciate the effects 
of federal constraints like tax harmonisation on the equilibria. 
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The problem is studied by extending the standard model for the study of 
interjurisdictional fiscal competition (MINTZ & TULKENS,1986, abbreviated as 
M&T) to environmental problems. The M&T model is a two region model where an 
origin based conunodity tax is levied on some private good to finance the 
supply of a local public good. Consumers in each region can allocate their 
consumption between domestic and non-domestic supply and do this in function 
of the relative prices, transport costs and taxes. In the "non-cooperative 
fiscal equilibrium " defined by M&T, different regimes can exist. Depending 
on the tax rates chosen by the regions there can be autarky, tax importing and 
tax exporting for each region. In general the tax rates tend to be too low, 
giving rise to an insufficient supply of local public goods. More precisely 
M&T and DE CROMBRUGGHE & TULKENS (1990) demonstrate that Pareto-improving tax 
policies never reduce taxes in both regions and always increase taxes in the 
tax-importing region. 
The M&T model is adapted by redefining the local public good as the level of 
the local environmental externality. A product (origin based) tax is the only 
instrument which can be used to regulate the level of the externality. The 
proceeds of the tax are redistributed to the consumers in a lump sum way. Two 
types of externalities can be considered: a production externality case where 
pollution is strictly proportional to the level of production in the region 
and a consumption externality case where the level of consumption is strictly 
proportional to the environmental externality in the region. There are no 
environmental spillovers between regions. 
It is demonstrated that the tax competition literature results can not be 
translated to the environmental tax competition problem. In general 
environmental taxes tend not to be too low at equilibrium. The fiscal 
equilibrium is however only fully efficient if all jurisdictions have 
identical production costs and preferences for the local environmental 
quality. There are no simple restrictions or prescriptions on environmental 
tax policy to guarantee an efficient environmental fiscal equilibrium. 
In chapter 2 we recall the main features of the M&T model and define different 
regimes for the interregional market economy. In chapter 3 we focus on the 
production externality case. A regional fiscal and environmental optimum is 
defined and the properties of the non-cooperative equilibrium are compared to 
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the Pareto-optimum. These properties are illustrated using a numerical example 
where the sensitivity of the equilibrium to other parameters like the relative 
size of the two countries are examined. 
2 MODEL STRUCTURE 
2.1 Basic Assumptions 
The M&T model is a two region, three goods model. Every region is homogeneous 
and has the same number of identical agents. The two regions are denoted i and 
j. The three goods are: a private good consumed in quantity Qi , labour 
supplied xi (measured negatively), and a local public good (here bad) Ri. The 
preferences of the consumer in region i are given by the continuously 
differentiable and quasi-concave utility function, strictly increasing in the 
private good and leisure but decreasing in the local public bad. 
U'(Q'.X',R~ (1) 
The quantity consumed of the private good can be supplied by local production 
Qii or can be bought abroad in a quantity Qji • The total transportation cost 
of bringing this quantity from j to i is given by the strictly increasing, 
convex continuously differentiable function ~ij (Qji). 
Labour can be supplied at home Xii or can be supplied in the other region in 
a quantity X/ without transport costs. This supply of labour is the 
counterpart of the import of the private consumption good. 
For each region we have by definition: 
(2) 
(3) 
Perfect competition and constant marginal costs generate fixed producer 
prices. Labour can be taken as the untaxed good and can be used as numeraire. 
This results in identical labour prices in both regions but production prices 
for the consumption good will in general differ because of absolute 
productivity differentials. Using a tax ti per unit of the private consumption 
good produced in region i and returning this tax to the inhabitant in a 
lumpsum way Ti we have the following two trade or production constraints: 
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P1 Qf +Xf =0 (4) 
(5) 
'Which after sununation and inclusion of the local tax variables yield the 
following budget equation (and implicit production possibility frontier) for 
i : 
(6) 
2.2 Differences with the Mintz & Tulkens model 
Our model diverges drastically from M&T in two respects. Firstly we have no 
local public good which needs resources to be produced, instead we have a 
negative externality directly linked to the production or consumption 
activities. 
There is a second more subtle difference on the tax instruments side. In M&T 
lumpsum taxes are absent so that the supply of the local public good always 
requires distortionary taxation on the consumption good. This is a rigid link 
in both directions: all tax revenue has to be spend on the local public good. 
We found this an unrealistic assumption, certainly in our context where the 
environmental tax revenue is a by-product. Therefore we introduced the 
possibility of lump-sum taxes or head taxes for all inhabitants of a region. 
The primary function of this head tax is to rechannel the revenue from 
environmental taxes to the inhabitants. Once we have this head tax at our 
disposal we could have included as well traditional local public goods in our 
model. Contrary to the M&T setting this would make no real contribution to our 
model because the local puplic good is financed by inhabitants and in a non-
distortionnary way. 
We will discuss two different types of externalities: production and 
consumption externalities. Both will be highly stylized and extreme cases 
without spillovers between regions. 
In the case of production externalities, the level of the externality will be 
strictly proportional to the total production of the consumption good in the 
region: 
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R' = Q,' + Q{ (7) 
In the case of consumption externalities, the total level of the externality 
will be equal to the total consumption of the good in the region: 
R' = Q' = Q,' + Q/ (8) 
Examples of production externalities are local air and water pollution, noise 
etc .. Examples of consumption externalities are congestion or air pollution 
by gasoline driven cars (both the gasoline and the cars can be bought abroad). 
It is important not to confuse consumption externality and consumption taxes: 
in this model all taxes are production taxes by assumption. 
We will not distinguish between consumption and production externalities in 
this prepatory section but will discuss them separately. 
2.3 Regional market equilibria 
Following M&T we define regional market equilibria (RME) as the allocation 
chosen by consumers and producers for given levels of taxes and a given level 
of the local externality which they consider as independent of their 
consumption decisions. 
This assumption can only be justified by considering that there is a large 
number of consumers in each region. 
The optimal choice of the fiscal parameters and the externality will only be 
discussed in the next chapter, here we concentrate on the behaviour of the 
representative consumer for given decisions of both local governments. 
A RME relative to a given set of fiscal and public good parameters (ti ,tj, 
Ri) is given by the solution of: 
max U1(Q1,X1,R~ 
lQ1,Q: ,Q; .x'l 
(9) 
under constraints (2),(3) and (6) 
Depending on the relative production costs, transport costs and taxes, region 
i can be in an autarkic equilibrium without any trade (I), in a mixed 
equilibrium (II) where it imports part of its consumption and in a no-
6 
production equilibrium where it imports all of its consumption. 
Such a regional market equilibrium is unique 1and can be characterised by the 
following two properties: 
(10) 
and for the type of equilibrium I (II and III respectively) we have the 
following relation between the prices of the consumption good: 
(11) 
Problem (9) is a traditional consumption problem which yields for each of the 
three types of equilibria demand functions for xi , Qii (equilibrium types I 
and II), Qi j (equilibrium types II and Ill), as well as for the total 
consumption Qi. We will focus on the properties of the demand functions for 
the consumption good, the demand for labour is then determined completely via 
the budget constraint (6). The demand for Q is a function of the tax rates in 
both regions, of the lump-sum tax and of the environmental quality in one 
own' s region. 
If we assume that the consumption good is not an inferior good we can 
determine the sign of the partial derivatives of these demand functions for 
the three different types of market equilibria we distinguished before (all 
other derivatives are zero): 
For autarky (I) 
1 See M&T prop 1 which applies here. 
i 
aQi aQi 
--=- s~o 
aR 1 aR 1 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
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For a mixed equilibrium (II) 
, ao' ao' aQ <O· -' <O· - 1 >O 
at 1 • at 1 • at 1 
aQ' OQ1 ao' 
-s0;-1 Sl!:0;-1 <0 
atl atl at1 
ao' ao: 
-=-sl!:O 
aR' aR' 
I ao, =o 
aR' 
ao' ao: 
-=-:<!:0 
err' aT' 
For a no-production equilibrium (III) 
aQ' ao; 
-=-s::-:0 
aR' aR' 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
These properties (except for the lumpsum tax effect) correspond with those in 
the M&T model. 
Property (18) is somewhat unexpected: the import of the consumption good does 
not vary with the level of the local environmental quality because the import 
can be considered as an intermediate good in the supply of the total quantity 
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of the consumption good Qi. It is the local production which will adjust in 
quantity because at the equilibrium import level the total marginal import 
cost (including the non-linear transport cost) equals the local price. 
2.4 Regimes of the interregional economy 
Combining the type of equilibria in both regions generates a regime of the 
interregional economy. Any pair of indirect taxes generates a unique regional 
market equilibrium in both regions and the combination of regional equilibrium 
types is called a regime of the interregional economy. This notion of regime 
introduced by M&T is very important because the switching of regimes is 
important in analyzing tax competition. 
Combining the three types of regional market equilibria for two regions gives 
the following 5 regimes: 
TABLE 1. 
Regime index type of equilibrium 'l'ype of equilibrium 
(from i's viewpoint) in !legion 1 in !legion 2 
1 I I 
2 I II 
3 II I 
4 I Ill 
5 Ill I 
While every taxpair determines a single regime, a given regime may be induced 
by many different taxpairs. The combinations of indirect tax rates generating 
these regimes are: 
(24) 
(25) 
(27) 
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P' +r' s: P' +r' +'t~<ofi with or> o. o:· = o J 
(29) 
(30) 
It is very convenient to use a graphically representation of these sets 
(FIGURE I). The slopes of the dividing lines between regimes 3, 1 and 2 equal 
1 by definition of regimes 2 and 3. The slope at the border of regimes 3 and 
5 is defined by: 
i i 
CJQ, dt 1 + CJQ,dt, =0 (31) 
at' at/ 
FIGURE 1. Set of indirect taxes generating the different regimes 
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3 EXTERNALITIES IN PRODUCTION 
3.1 Regional fiscal optimum 
A Regional Fiscal Optimum (RFO) is an optimal fiscal choice (and level of the 
externality) which is embedded in a regional market equilibrium and which 
takes the fiscal choice of the other region as given. 
The local government can choose levels of ti and Ti which satisfy her budget 
constraint: 
(32) 
Using the indirect utility function 
(33) 
where 
Q1(.)==Qf (t1,tl,R1,T1 ) + Qj (t1,tl), (34) 
A Regional Fiscal Optimum is then the maximum with respect to ti, Ti, Ri of 
the following Lagrangian problem: 
in which the constraints are the definition of the local production 
externality and the local public budget. In this maximisation problem the 
local government takes the tax rate in the other region as given. 
The problem structure is different for regimes 1 and 3 where the region i does 
not export and for regimes 2 and 4 where region i exports. 
For regimes 1 and 3 the following first order conditions hold: 
I I 
asf aut I I aQ, I 1 aQ, I 
- == --Q, + W1,3- + cl>1.3(t - +Q1 ) =0 
at' ax' at' at' 
(37) 
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;:v, t t i!Yii au' . , V><t , , ao, 
- =- + 1lr1,3(- -1) + cl>ut - =0 BR 1 BR 1 BR 1 BR 1 
(38) 
l l asr.' au' , ao, , , ao, 
- =- + llr1,3- + cl>1,3t (- -1) =0 
aT' ax' or' or' 
(39) 
summing (37) and (39), premultiplied by Qii ,yields an expression forti 
in regimes 1 and 3: 
(40) 
The numerator represents the marginal welfare cost of a unit of the local 
externality. Using (40) and (38) we see that the total marginal welfare cost 
of the local externality equals the partial direct effect on utility. The 
denominator represents the welfare value of one unit of local tax income, 
which in our model with lumpsum taxes equals the marginal utility of income 
of the local residents .. This follows from solving (37) for 4>. 
(41) 
In this case the indirect tax ti corresponds to a pure Pigouvian tax. This was 
expected: in regimes 1 and 3 there are no exports and the only function of the 
tax is to add to the local production cost, the marginal cost of the 
externality. 
For regimes 2 and 4, the first order condition for the optimal choice of ti 
is different: 
. t J t J asr.' au' , , aQ, ao, , , aQ, ao, , 1 
-=--Q, + 11rz,4(-+-) + cl>2.4lt (-+-)+Q1 +Q1 ]=0 
at' ax' at1 at' at' at' 
(42) 
Combining this expression with (38) and (39) and using the Slutsky compensated 
price effects, one can derive the following expression for the optimal tax 
rate in regimes 2 and 4: 
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(43) 
In regimes 2 and 4 region i exports to the other region. This explains the 
extra term in the optimal tax expression. The tax now equals a Pigouvian term 
to which a kind of disguised export tax is added. Raising the production tax 
above the marginal damage (the Pigouvian tax level) has two effects: a 
negative allocative effect and a positive revenue generating effect. The 
negative allocative effect is given by the compensated price effect in the 
denominator and represents the allocative distortions linked to overpricing 
the local consumption good. 
The positive effect is the extra revenue which can be raised on exports by 
raising the price above the social cost. If the allocative effect and the 
externality damage terms in the first termwere absent, the second term would 
equal the expected inverse price elasticity termmultiplied by the production 
price. This disguised role of Pigouvian taxes as export taxes is discussed in 
a partial equilibrium ·framework by KRUTILLA (1991). We use a general 
equilibrium approach and this explains the presence of a compensated home 
price elasticity in (43). Another difference with KRUTILLA is that he excludes 
endogenous reactions of the other countries or jurisdictions. In the next 
paragraphs we will explicitly consider the behaviour of the trade partner. 
3.2 Interregional fiscal externalities 
Some jurisdictions may wish to take advantage of the possibility of exporting 
taxes. The fact that an increase in j's environmental tax rate raises i's tax 
base can be interpreted as a fiscal externality. The magnitude of these 
interregional externalities depends on the regime and can be derived by 
differentiating (36) for the different regimes. 
r1 
r2 
aft 
-=0 
atl 
(44) 
(45) 
r3 
r4 
r5 
13 
' ::v~i aQi ~ = tf11-"'<_l + $1 t 1- 1 =0 
cri 4 cri 4 cri 
a;r = _ au' Q' 
oti ox' 1 
(46) 
(47) 
Raising the environmental tax tj in region j can, depending on the regime have 
three types of effects on the welfare of region i: 
TABLE 2. 
Regime index (from i•s Pollution Public Private Total 
viewpoint Revenue Consumption effect 
1 (autarky) 0 0 0 0 
2 (i is tax exporter) 
- + 0 + 
3 (i imports partly) 
-
+ 
- -
4 (j imports all) 0 0 0 0 
5 (i imports all) 0 0 
- -
Of course in autarky (r=1) there is no effect. When region i exports (r=2,4) 
there is a negatively valued pollution effect because of the increased 
exports. In these cases there will also be a positive public revenue effect 
via the increased exports. When region i imports ( ra:::3, 5), raising the 
environmental tax in j has a negative impact on the consumption possibilities. 
For regimes 2 and 3 the signs of the fiscal externality effect can only be 
determined along the optimal reaction curve of region i, this means by using 
( 40) and ( 42). 
If the effects of the fiscal externality in regimes 2 and 3 would have been 
positive we would return to the traditional fiscal competition outcome: both 
regions fighting for the tax base and arriving in an equilibrium which is not 
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public good. As demonstrated by DE CROMBRUGGHE & TULKENS (1990), a 
simultaneous rise in the tax rate is Pareto-improving because if one of the 
regions is in regime 2 the other will be in regime 3 and both effects are 
positive. 
This conjecture does not carry over to the case of Pigouvian taxes. One does 
not have to fear a situation where the competition for the tax base drives all 
regions to too low tax rates and suboptimal environmental qualities. The 
exporting tax region (r=2) will always set her tax rate above the marginal 
externality cost, consequently an increase in the tax rate of the importing 
region will increase the possibilities for tax exporting which is beneficial 
for region i, this result parallels M&T. The difference lies in the situation 
of the importing region (r=3). This region uses the tax for only one purpose: 
to correct for the externality cost of its own production. A raising tax in 
j will increase production in region i but this is a reaction trying to limit 
the negative consumption effect. The two other effects (negative pollution 
effect and positive revenue effect) always compensate each other when the tax 
rate is chosen optimally. 
In DE CROMBRUGGE & TULKENS (1990), on the contrary, the reason the tax exists 
is to supply a quantity of the local public good, this supply is too small as 
well as the local tax because each increase in the local tax forces consumers 
to import at higher cost abroad (rising marginal transport cost). An increase 
in the tax rate of the tax exporter relaxes this constraint and this is the 
reason why the public revenue effect dominates the private consumption effect. 
3.3 Fiscal competition 
We now can start to analyze the simultaneous tax decisions of both regions. 
This is done by defining a static non-cooperative game: each region sets the 
tax rate that optimizes its welfare, taking the tax rate of the other region 
as given. We have an equilibrium when both tax rates are a best reply. 
We can define reaction functions for both regions in the t,t space and look 
for intersections of both curves. 
One of the main results in the tax competition literature is the multi-
valuedness of the reaction functions (see e.g.M&T). This multi-valuedness 
creates problems for the existence of an equilibrium but it is also at the 
origin of the proposition that there are Pareto-improving tax increases. 
·-..... 
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FIGURE 2 . 
. ENVIRONMENTAL FISCAL EQUILIBRIUM 
0.0 
tj 
We are able to show that the same multi-valuedness does not appear in our 
modelsetting. A typical reaction function is shown in FIGURE 2. On the 
reaction functions fi(tj) and fj(ti) shown the arrows are used to indicate the 
direction in which the changes in utility are shown. A + (-) sign above a 
reaction curve means that Utility increases when one moves into the direction 
of the arrows. For region i, the figure shows that for low tax rates in the 
other region, region i prefers to import and sets its tax rate equal to the 
marginal externality cost of production at home. As the tax rate in the other 
region increases, this reduces the welfare of region i because of the private 
consumption effect. For increasing tax rates in j , the import of region i 
decreases to arrive in an autarky equilibrium. For still higher tax rates in 
j , region i becomes the exporter and adds to the marginal cost of the 
externality a disguised export term. Now the welfare of region i increases for 
increasing taxes in j. In this figure one would have a non-cooperative 
equilibrium in point E. without more specification it is difficult to study 
the properties of the non-cooperative equilibria. We will therefore explore 
the properties of this non-cooperative equilibrium with the help of an example 
in the next paragraph. 
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Before entering the example it is useful to point out the Pareto-optimal 
solutions for this taxation problem. 
This can be found by maximising the following problem (for regime 2) with 
respect to the tax rates in both regions: 
This generates tax rates, which in the case where i is exporting and j 
importing (regime 2) equal: 
(51) 
(52) 
The structure of these expressions can be compared with expression (43) for 
the exporting region i and with expression (40) for the importing region j. 
The differences can best be understood as a typical second best result. The 
importing region is now required to add a correction term to her Pigouvian tax 
which will be a function of the deviation from Pigouvian tax setting in region 
i. The same holds for region i: the tax export term is now corrected for the 
negative private consumption effect in the importing region and for deviations 
from Pigouvian tax setting in the importing region. These solutions are 
clearly different from the non-cooperative case but we will have to wait for 
a better specified example in order to state whether the taxes are higher or 
lower. It is also important to see that it is only when lump-sum transfers 
between regions are allowed that we return to a first best world with pure 
Pigouvian taxes in both regions for all regimes. 
The next step is to compare the non-cooperative tax equilibrium with the 
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Pareto-optimum solutions. This comparison can generate ideas to discover 
Pareto-improving tax combinations which might be the object of cooperative 
behaviour. In a richer institutional context we can consider central 
government constraints on the tax behaviour and test the performance of tax 
harmonization rules, closed border solutions etc .• 
Up to now clearcut results could only be obtained for a more restricted case. 
3.4 Fiscal competition illustrated 
3.4.1 The simplifications used 
It is only when the utility functions are specified that more detailed 
comparisons can be made of the different tax solutions. We used an additive 
utility function, quadratic in Qi and linear in X and R combined with a 
quadratic transport cost function. This form guarantees the uniqueness of the 
optimal tax solution in each regime for a given tax rate in the other region 
(M&T,l986). An additive utility function contains the important simplification 
that the demand for the local environmental quality is independent of the 
quantity of private goods. The linearity of the utility function in X makes 
it an easy numeraire and combined with the linearity of the utility function 
in R, we have a marginal willingness to pay for the environment which is 
constant. This latter property will generate simple reaction curves. 
The specification used is: 
U1 = a(Q: + Qj)- d(Qf + Qj )2 + bX1 + cR 1 
budget constraint (p 1 + t 1 ) Q: +(pi+ ti) Q~ + e( Qj )2 + X 1 - T1 =0 (53) 
with b,d,e > 0 as well as p 1+t1 < ~ 
In order to structure the discussion we start with regions of the same size 
and introduce then systematic differences in the production cost and in the 
preferences for the environmental quality. Next we relax the assumption of 
identical sizes for the regions. 
For each case we discuss five different types of tax equilibria: the Nash non-
cooperative equilibrium as the starting point, the Pareto-optimal equilibria 
and the set of Pareto-improving tax equilibria as cooperative solutions and 
finally the tax harmonisation and closed border solutions which can be 
considered as focal points in the negotiation or as institutionally generated 
cooperative solutions. 
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3.4.2 The case of identical regions 
This case is graphically illustrated in FIGURE 3. In order to simplify the 
interpretation, the marginal willingness to pay for the environment and the 
production cost per unit were calibrated so as to equal 1. The reaction curves 
(denoted fi(tj) and fj(ti)) are continuous. They are constant when the region 
imports (equal to the marginal damage of the externality -c/b) and starts to 
rise from the autarky point onwards. The rate of increase in this zone depends 
on the parameter choice. This type of shape guarantees a unique equilibrium 
which in this case equals the Pigouvian tax solution. The non-cooperative 
solution is here Pareto-optimal. 
This contrasts with the tax competition literature (M&T) where, due to the 
discontinuity in the reaction curves one region either exports or imports but 
remains never in autarky. The reason is that positive tax rates are needed to 
finance the supply of the local public good, so each region whenever it is 
importing but almost in autarky is interested in lowering its tax and to 
become an exporter and compensate the lower tax rate by an increase in volume. 
FIGURE 3. 
OPTIMAL ENVIRONMENTAL FISCAL EQUILIBRIUM 
· Nash equilibrium 
. 
·-..... 
3 
2.5 
2 
1.5 
1 
0.5 
45° 
0 1.5 20 25 0.0 0.5 1.0 
tj 
In our case, when both regions use Pigouvian taxes, none of the regions has 
an interest in deviating from this equilibrium. Starting from the equilibrium, 
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suppose region i lowered its tax, it could export to region j but this would 
generate negative externalities which are larger than the marginal tax 
revenue. Suppose now that region i increased its tax above the Pigouvian 
level, it would start to import from j and would lower welfare because with 
these imports are associated extra transport costs. 
3.4.3 Differences in production costs 
The following figure illustrates the case where the production cost in region 
is 2/3 of the production cost in region j. This generates a Nash equilibrium 
where the region with the lowest production costs exports and adds an export 
tax to its Pigouvian tax. The importing region continues to use a Pigouvian 
tax. This equilibrium is illustrated in FIGURE 4 (the tax rates and utility 
levels for the different equilibria can be found in the table in appendix). 
The Nash equilibrium (point N) can be compared with the set of Pareto 
equilibria indicated by the line PP. The different allocations on this line 
differ by the distribution of utility between the two regions. Pareto 
improving tax combinations can be found in the direction N to PI. This 
direction implies keeping ti constant or slightly decreased but to increase 
the tax in the importing region j. This is beneficial for both regions: the 
export from i to j increases, this means higher fiscal revenues for region i. 
For region j the higher imports imply higher marginal transport costs but this 
is compensated by the lower level of the negative externality. 
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FIGURE 4. 
ENVIRONMENTAL FISCAL EQUILIBRIUM 
0.5 
region i lower production costs 
n6 n1 ns n9 ·to 11 12 
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Tax reforms are very often of a non-marginal type. One of the focal points is 
the harmonization at the average of non-cooperative tax rates. This type of 
averaging can be Pareto-improving in tax competition situations, this has been 
shown by (KEEN,l987) for taxes of the destination type. Harmonization has also 
been the major principle in the latest proposals of the EC. 
The average of non-cooperative taxes is represented by point H on the Figure. 
This implies a welfare gain for region j which has lower import costs but a 
welfare loss for region i which leases tax export revenue. So harmonization 
is not necessarily Pareto-improving. 
A last type of equilibrium which can be considered is the closed border 
situation. One could imagine that when one region is really worse off in an 
open border situation, that this region can threaten to use obstacles to 
trade. The closed border equilibrium is shown as point C. In autarky every 
region uses simple Pigouvian taxes. 
3.4.4 Differences in environmental preferences 
Starting with identical regions it is difficult to assume that all regions 
have the same preferences for environmental quality. The differences in 
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preferences for local public goods without spillovers are one of the basic 
motivations for fiscal federalism (OATES, 1972). 
In our example it was assumed that in region i the marginal willingness to pay 
for the environmental quality was increased by 20 %. 
The resulting Nash equilibrium (N in FIGURE 5 ) contains imports by region i. 
Region j uses the higher Pigouvian tax in region i to set an export tax and 
to increase its tax revenue. 
It would be Pareto-optimal to use Pigouvian taxes or taxes which are higher 
or lower but where the tax remains relatively higher in region i than in j 
(line PP). The Pareto-improving direction PI can be explained by the tendency 
to reflect the real difference in environmental preferences into the tax 
differences. This implies higher imports for region i, the higher cost of 
these is compensated by the gain in environmental quality. for region j the 
higher exports increase its tax revenue. 
The harmonization of taxes is here a very bad solution: the differences in 
valuation of the environment disappear and we end up in an autarky situation 
(point H) where the beneficial transfer of production from i to j is excluded. 
The closed border solution (C) is also an autarky situation but is better tan 
harmonization in the sense that the production level in each region can be 
adapted to the local preferences. Compared to the non-cooperative open border 
solution, region i can improve its position by closing its border. 
1.8 
1.6 
1.4 
....... 1.2 
1 
0.8 
0.6 
FIGURE 5 • 
. ENVIRONMENTAL FISCAL EQUILIBRIUM 
region i higher environmental preferences 
0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 
tj 
1.4 1.5 1.6 1. 7 
22 
3.4.5 Regions of different size 
The relative size of regions seems to play an important role in tax 
competition. KANBUR & KEEN (1991) show that there is a tendency for the small 
to exploit the large. This seems to be confirmed by the present tax heavens 
in Europe. 
We introduce the differences in relative size of the two jurisdictions into 
the model by the parameter N which will take values 1 (regions of identical 
size), 2/3 which means that region i is 33% smaller than region j and finally 
1.50 which means that region i is larger than region j. 
In FIGURE 6 the fiscal reaction curves are shown for different relative sizes. 
As long as the regions are of same type there will be no trade and we will 
have no tax competition whatever the relative size of the two regions 
involved. Whenever there is a production cost difference or a difference in 
environmental preferences, the relative size will start to matter. At this 
moment the slopes of the reaction curves come in to play. 
We could generate cases where tax competition appears by reintroducing 
differences in production cost and in environmental preferences. We prefer to 
illustrate the role of size by showing the dependence of the per capita 
utility levels of region i associated to varying tax levels in region j. This 
is shown in FIGURE 7 • As long as the region is importing, its size does not 
matter for given tj. When the region is exporting however its relative size 
becomes important: the lower its size the higher the export tax it can use and 
the higher the maximum utility level it can attain for given tj. 
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4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It is demonstrated in a standard model for interjurisdictional tax 
competition, that the tax competition literature results can not be translated 
to the environmental tax competition problem for externalities linked to the 
production. A model is used with 2 regions, two tradeable private goods 
(labour and a private consumption good) which can be taxed at the production 
level and one non tradeable local public good. In general environmental taxes 
tend not to be too low at equilibrium. The fiscal equilibrium is however only 
fully efficient if all jurisdictions have identical production costs and 
preferences for the local environmental quality. In this case decentralisation 
of environmental policy is not very interesting. In the other cases there are 
no simple restrictions or prescriptions on environmental tax policy like e.g. 
tax harmonisation to guarantee an efficient decentralised environmental fiscal 
equilibrium. 
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APPENDIX 
Reference case 
Region NASH equilibrium Tax 
harmonization 
i ti = 1 
ui = 120 
j tj = 1 
uj .. 120 
REGION i lower production costs 
i ti = 1.1 ti = 1.05 
ui = 164.20 uioc 164.09 
j tj = 1 tj = 1.05 
uj 
.. 122.49 uj = 124.31 
REGION i higher environmental preferences 
i ti = 1.20 ti = 1.13 
ui= 98.04 ui ... 97.05 
j tj = 1 .06 tj = 1.13 
uj = 120.31 uj .. 119.49 
Closed border 
solution 
ti = 1 
ui= 163.33 
tj = 1 
uj = 120.00 
ti = 1.20 
ui = 99.00 
tj = 1 
uj ... 120.00 
Differences of the sizes of the regions involved N=l, N=2/3 or N=l.S 
i ti = 1 
ui-= 120 
j tj = 1 
uj = 120 
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